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The Segmentation of Public Labour Market in France 
 
 
 Introduction  
In the context of global economic crisis, public expenditure and national debt are now priorities on 
the European political agenda. To reduce the wage bill, nearly all European countries decided to cut 
wages and jobs in the public sector (Glassner 2010). But budgetary austerity follows twenty to thirty 
years trend of reforms within the public sector: in many occidental countries, the very notion and 
aim of public service have been discussed over and over during the last decades – mainly leading to 
the outsourcing to local authorities of public services or private sector (Dreyfus, Eymeri, 2006). In 
many countries, public employment is now organised around a three-fold structure: the core (civil 
servants and pen ended contracts), the periphery (short-term contracts) and the margin (subsidized 
employment, Meyer 2006). Indeed, “to take advantage of existing labour force divisions or to create 
new ones”, which can be done through growing share of short-term workers relative to civil servants 
(Grimshaw, Rubery and Marino 2012, p. 87) is a more indirect (but highly effective) way to reduce 
the wage bill. 
Reforms of the public sector in France come out of an international long standing pressure for 
“destandardization”, conflicting with the institutional tradition of a national regulatory system 
(Mossé, 2010). On the one hand, civil servants’ unions defend and promote strong statutory 
regulation, on the other hand, public employers ask for more flexibility. After the 2008 crisis, the 
pace of public employment deregulation has been speeding up (Audier, Bacache, Courtioux, Gautié, 
2012). But for now, French government has better to increase short-term contracts in public sector 
than cut wages and jobs of civil servants.  
There are very few surveys on segmentation and employment regulation in the French public sector. 
I will show that 'non-standard' employment has always been included into the regulation system to 
give public employers some flexibility. Even the 1983 law, which fixed the labour standards of French 
civil service, allows public employers to recruit short-term workers. But a new form of dualism arose 
in French public sector in the mid-2000, through two laws voted in 2005 and 2012 to reduce 
precarious employment in public sector. Those laws are actually shaping an unusual dualism 
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between civil servants and “non-standard” permanent public workers, and not only between civil 
servants and short-term workers.  
The first section gives an overview of employment segmentation within the strategies implemented 
to reduce public sector’s bill in France and in Europe since the 2008 crisis. Section 2 takes a step 
backwards to examine the transformation of public employment regulation during the last decades, 
in a context of massive public administration reforms. Key features of French public employment 
regulation, past and present, are summarized in section 3. The dynamic capacity of LMS, and 
particularly their relevance to think individual mobility are discussed in section 4. The last section 
concludes. 
 Methodology 
This paper is based on two categories of empirical research materials engaging two distinct methods. 
Firstly, the deregulation of public employment is analysed trough in-depth analysis of documents and 
archives. These documents allow us to describe the arguments used by different actors during the 
social negotiation preparing the draft of 2012 Law on public employment, using both archives from 
civil servants trade unions (pamphlets, internal meeting reports) and from the national ministry of 
civil service (internal meeting documents and reports). Secondly, we explore the statistical archives 
of the Ministry of Civil Service to create new datasets on public sector workforce, and show evidence 
of an increasing and heterogeneous use of non-standard employment on public labour market. 
 
 Section 1 Overview of employment segmentation within strategies to reduce public 
sector’s bill in France and in Europe since the 2008 crisis 
Austerity politics were more or less severe from one country to another due to the scale of the crisis 
being experienced very differently. “Because a large proportion of government spending covers the 
salaries of the public sector workforce, many countries have implemented measures to downsize 
jobs and to cut or freeze pay” (Grimshaw et. al., 2012, p. i). Hence, half of the 27 European Union 
members have implemented unprecedented wage cuts from 2009 to 2010, while most of the other 
preferred freezing the pay (Glassner 2010). The trend is confirmed with 2010-2012 data (Grimshaw 
2012).  
The economic diagnosis for France is obviously similar: government deficit is higher than ever. But is 
seems not fair to consider that French public service is experiencing an austerity policy. 1: wages and 
bonuses have not been cut, compared to cuts in nominal wages which went up to 10%, 20%, or even 
25% in Romania. 2. The adjustment of wage with inflation has been frozen since 2010, but 
individually civil servants still experience wage increases through automatic progression based on 
seniority. 3. The recruitment flows of civil servants are decreasing (Figure 1). Between 2002 and 
2012, the annual recruitments flows have been divided by two (from 50 000 to 22 000), whereas the 
average living flow was constant around 55 000. Therefore, the civil service replacement rate has 
also been divided by two during the period. Data show that this decrease is not the immediate 
consequence of the global crisis and of some external strain (e. g. OECD, European Institutions…): the 
trend was declining since 2002, but the shift occurred in 2006 one year before the President 
Sarkozy’s large reform in favour of the non-replacement of one out of two civil servants retiring. 
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So the decreasing incoming flows of civil servants in France is not (only) a response to the public 
deficit crisis, but rather a re-enforcement of a path initiated long ago. As Grimshaw, Rubery and 
Marino said, “The current crisis is exacerbating longer term pressures to reform public sector pay and 
employment practices” (2012, p. xii).  
Figure 1 
In and out annual flows in French central government, from 2002 to 2012 
 
Sources: official annual reports on the public services workforce 2013. Recruitment flows: annual survey of the 
DG for Administration and the Civil Service; living flows: State pension service, Ministry of Finances. 
I argue that the main strategy to reduce public wage bill in France, is to increase internal 
differentiation: in 2012, one third of public services workforce was employed under non-standard 
contracts1. These divisions have a high impact on wages. The segmentation has led to a reduction in 
the cost of public employment for several reasons. 1. Short-term contracts give employers 
quantitative flexibility, as employment duration is settled from the very beginning (up to 3 years 
according to the public code). 2. There is empirical evidence of a pay penalty for short-term workers 
(Kerjosse, Remila, 2013). 3. Short-term workers in the public sector are much younger than civil 
servants (34% are less than 30, compared to 9%). This ageing workforce raises the costs of statutory 
employment as there is a seniority pay for civil servants.  
In France as in other countries, this segmentation strategy also comes out of a longer trend. Let’s 
take a step back to consider the consequences of the 1980s and 1990s political agenda of the State 
reform on public employment.  
 
                                                          
1 Source: official annual reports on the public services workforce, 2015. The ratio is calculated including to the denominator 
all non civil servants, id est short-term contracts, but also all categories usually put in another statistical category: working 
status, teachers from private schools that are paid by the Ministry of Education, childminders, etc. The numerator is the 
number of statutory civil servants. The ratio commonly used by the government and unions is calculated dividing the 
number of short-term contracts by all public service agents, id est. civil servants, the military, and other categories, which 
gives a 17% share of non civil servants! 
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 Section 2: the transformation of public employment regulation during the last decades, in a 
context of massive public administration reforms  
The reforms initiated by the French Government since the end of the 1990s primarily aimed at 
transforming the State’s organization and structure (Bezes 2009). From this point of view, the French 
Governments have been following their own paths, taking inspiration from their European 
neighbours. Yet, nobody in France has studied the consequences of these reforms on the forms and 
conditions of employment associated with the organizations and structures.  
Unlike Italy for example, none of the French governments has ever dared to reduce the statutory 
privilege for workers with sovereign power functions during the fifth Republic. This (repeated) choice 
is a very strong one, as there have been many debates on this point, even law propositions to do so, 
all over the twenties’ (Rouban 2009) and this is continuing since 2000. 
Instead, as Grimshaw et al (2012) show, the share of short-term employment in the central 
government has been growing in France as in other European countries. The data used in this report 
suggest a similar average (around 15%) all over the 5 countries included in the comparison (France, 
UK, Sweden, Hungary and Germany). Figure 2 shows a 25% increase of short-term staff in ten years 
(296 000 to 365 000), compared to the 9% decrease of statutory civil servants (1 720 000 to 
1 582 000) during the same period.  
Figure 2 
Number of short-term workers and civil servants in the central government, 
and ratio STW/CS, from 1990 to 2011 
 
Sources: official annual reports on the public services workforce, 2008-2009, 2012 and 2013. 
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One of the biggest change in the French government’s administrative culture over the last two 
decades was the multiplication of public agencies2, as a way to increase budgetary responsibility of 
the top management while getting employment flexibility. These public sector units under the 
government control are sometimes “set up to circumvent constraints incurred through the special 
employment status of public sector workers or civil servants” (Grimshaw, 2012, p. xi): even if they are 
publicly founded and controlled, the legal regulation of public services workforce doesn’t apply. That 
is one of the reasons why the share of employment in the agencies, at the government level, has 
increased from 7% in 1996 to 18% in 2010. Figure 3 shows the growing trend of public workers in the 
public agencies under the control of the government, compared to the decreasing trend of the 
government perimeter. According to the same data, the share of short-term workers reach 153% in 
public agencies, compared to 8% at government level (the figures were very close in 1998). Lastly, 
due to different in and out flows, data at the government level show a spectacular concentration of 
atypical employment in these organisations: one third of short-term workers employed by the French 
government in 1998 were working in agencies; they were more than two third in 2010.  
Figure 3 
Number of short-term workers and civil servants in the central government, 
and ratio STW/CS, from 1990 to 2011 
 
Sources: official annual reports on the public services workforce, 2005-2006 and 2012. 
 
Contrary to most European countries, French short-term contracts in the public sector (in 
government as well as in public agencies) are ruled by the public code and not by the private labour 
code. In other words, the regulation of this employment form comes from the law or from a 
government decree. Another major difference concerns the very recent introduction of open-ended 
                                                          
2 Namely “établissements publics”, or “opérateurs de l’Etat”, which proliferation has become a major political concern for 
the National Court of Auditors, see “French State and its agencies”, report n°2011-M-44-01. 
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contract in French public service: until 2005, public administrations could only hire public servants or 
short-term workers. Hence, open-ended contracts have for long never been allowed in the public 
sector, particularly at the government level. In 2005, the public sector decided to transpose a 
European directive against abusive renewal of short-term contracts3 and did so through a specific law 
in 2005. Since then, public employers are allowed to propose open-ended contracts to their short-
term workers with over 6 years of experience in the same organization. In 2012, a new law 
authorized public employers to hire workers directly with a long-term contract. 
These two laws have dramatically changed the nature of social relations inside public service. To 
understand it, we have to look more deeply at employment regulation in French public sector. 
 Section 3: Key features of past and present public employment regulation in France  
Historical research materials show that unstable political compromises progressively closed the 
administrative labour market around World War II. The exclusion of public workers from the private 
labour code (which was still under construction at that time) was far to reach a social consensus. The 
statutory code for public services workforce finally became a general law in 1983. From then on, it 
became synonymous with job security and acted as a model for the entire labour market, setting 
minimum standards. 
For social actors as for academics, public service means statutory and lifetime employment, which is 
accessible through a competitive exam. This exam allows you to get regular promotion, seniority pay, 
and pension when you become old enough to stop working. In France, scholars, politics and unions 
have for a very long time mixed up this pattern combining lifetime employment and seniority right 
with typical internal labour market, ignoring the existence of short-term contracts in public sector.  
Among the few French academics who are working on public employment segmentation, C. 
Nosbonne (2003, 2013) is the only one to propose a pattern of it (figure 4). 
Figure 4 
The segmentation of public employment according to C. Nosbonne 
 
Source : Nosbonne, 2013, Nouvelle revue du travail, p. 11. 
                                                          
3 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by 
ETUC, UNICE and CEEP. 
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This pattern was designed for the average of European countries (see Meyer 2006) - I will later 
discuss the definition of the boundaries and the distribution of employment forms within the 
segments. Most importantly, this pattern is built upon the very strong assumption that public 
employment segmentation in Europe is the direct consequence of neoliberal politics, especially those 
of OECD and European institutions. It is, however, partially wrong in the case of France. 
My survey shows that atypical or non-permanent employment has always coexisted with the civil 
servant employment norm. The 1983 civil service labour code precisely defines the civil servant 
status as the typical form of work in public sector. But in the meantime, it also set up atypical 
employment, namely short-term employment. The vocabulary used in the text of the law is 
meaningful: those workers are named “agents non-titulaires” (a translation of which could be “non 
civil servants”). Hence, atypical “forms of work and employment […] are essentially defined 
negatively – in one way or another they deviate from the ‘normal’ employment relationship” 
(Hyman, 2013, p. 15) from the very beginning of the employment regulation process in the public 
service. 
The major change in the regulation of short-term contracts in public sector since 1983 was the 
introduction of permanent employment for non-statutory workers, id est non civil servants (in 2005). 
This represents a major ideological shift. The government didn’t have to sidestep formal processes of 
social dialogue: the civil servants’ unions accepted the fact, in the name of the struggle against 
precarious employment. A collective bargaining about non-statutory workers took place from 2010 
to 2011, preparing the terms of the 2012 law. But still, the agreement signed by the French 
Government and by 6 of the 8 civil service unions represents a breakdown of the traditional social 
relations. Now, public workers can get job security just as civil servants, but without the main 
statutory advantage: seniority rising pay, which stays a privilege acquired by succeeding a 
competitive exam to become civil servant. In other words, the 2012 law creates distinct and strongly 
unequal career paths for public workers. 
How is such an ideological shift possible? I can suggest three main reasons. 1. As mentioned before, 
and as surprisingly as it is, nobody in France has ever shown a scientific interest in the coexistence of 
short-term workers and civil servants in the civil sector. 2. Short-term workers in the public sector 
have been excluded from the social dialogue until 2012 Law: before that, they could neither vote nor 
be elected. As a matter of fact, they don’t form a political class, and the political compromise has for 
long been reached between government and civil servants unions. This compromise was for unions 
to accept public employers to recruit short-term workers, and for the successive governments to set 
up integration laws4 every 10 years on average. 3. The political invisibility of short-term workers in 
the public sector comes from the non-permanence of this situation, not because their contract is 
short, but because some of them actually become civil servants a few years after their recruitment.  
This last critic addresses the static character of the pattern: it doesn’t consider the individual mobility 
from one segment to another, especially the mobility from short-term contract to statutory 
employment. 
 
                                                          
4 The 1983, 1996 and 2001 integration laws gave easier access to statutory employment, organizing reserved selective 
exams to enter civil servant groups. 
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 Section 4: Is the concept of LMS relevant to think individual mobility? 
Figure 5 proposes a new pattern of public employment segmentation in the case of France, changing 
the boundaries and the distribution of the different forms of employment within segments. On the 
one hand, external flexibility is composed with private forms of employment (subsidized jobs), 
outsourcing and temporary work. One the other hand, internal flexibility is composed with short-
term contracts, because open-ended contracts now represent a part of the very core of the 
segmentation frame. But the main input of this new pattern is the pointers, which represent 
individual mobility. Short-term contracts are not (only) a marginalized form of employment, it is also 
a way to get to permanent jobs and to civil servant status.  
On average, one out of two short-term workers leaves the public sector during the 4 years following 
their hiring (Bessière, Pouget, 2007); the orange pointer represents this flow out. But within the rest, 
one out of three is still on short-term contract in the public sector (they stay in the light blue 
segment), and one out of seven has become a civil servant (this is the dark blue pointer). Every year, 
10 to 15% of laureates from competitive exams to enter the French public services workforce are 
short-term workers from the public sector5. Nowadays, fewer laureates from competitive exams to 
enter the French public services workforce are coming from the educational system; they are more 
and more older workers with a few years experience of short-term contracts in the public or private 
sector (Kerjosse, Remila, 2013). This will certainly change the nature and the extent of public service 
motivation and values. 
Figure 5  
A new pattern of public employment segmentation 
 
 
                                                          
5 Sources: official annual reports on the public services workforce, from 2000 to 2015. 
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In a few years, it will be possible to count how many short-term workers got an open-ended contract 
compared to those who became civil servants. With adequate data, it will be very interesting to test 
one hypothesis: do the latter possess the same demographic and social characteristics as those who 
become civil servants without experiencing short-term employment in the public sector? Do the 
former have completely different characteristics? In other words, we may be able to confirm the 
fundamental hypothesis of ILM theory. 
 Conclusion  
The goal of this paper was to address the changing form of public employment regulation in France. 
What’s new is the division within permanent civil service workers: “statutory staff” retains job 
security, guaranteed wage progression with seniority and promotion perspectives, whereas 
“contractual staff” can only get job security without any of these advantages.  
These results allow us to discuss the threefold structure of public employment (Meyer, 2006). In the 
case of France, we argue that the very core of public employment is now dual.  
Lastly, taking career paths in the public sector into consideration allows us to question the porosity of 
borders between core and periphery.  If theoretical reformulation appears as a necessary condition 
to enable a dynamic analysis of the segmentation, I hope this paper tends to demonstrate the 
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